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Gifts by
Fiduciaries
by Tax
Options and
Elections

F

iduciaries often face many tax
options and elections during the
administration of an estate or
trust. The manner in which the fiduciary exercises, or does not exercise, tax
elections and options will significantly
affect one, some, or all of the beneficiaries. In some cases, it may cause the
fiduciary to have made a gift for federal gift tax purposes. This article
explores some of the ways in which a
fiduciary might be treated as making a
gift by exercising or not exercising certain tax elections or options.

Slug Signorino

By Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Stephanie E. Heilborn,
and Mitchell M. Gans

General Rules Regarding Gifts
As a general rule, only individuals can
make transfers that are subject to federal gift tax. See Code § 2501(a)(1).
Certain “look-through” rules apply
when a legal entity, such as a corporation, rather than a natural person,
makes or receives a transfer. Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2511–1(h)(1). Any completed transfer for less than full and adequate consideration in money or money’s worth
by an individual to someone else is
subject to gift tax unless an exemption,
exclusion, or deduction applies. Treas.
Reg. § 25.2511–2(b). A transfer of property is complete to the extent the donor
does not retain an interest in the property or dominion and control over the
property to render the transfer incomplete. A transfer made at arm’s length,
free of donative intent, and in the ordinary course of business is deemed to
be made for full and adequate consideration. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512–8. An
individual may make a gift under
Section 2511 by transferring an interest
Jonathan G. Blattmachr is a partner at
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy
LLP, New York, New York. Stephanie
E. Heilborn is an associate at Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, New
York, New York. Mitchell M. Gans is a
professor at Hofstra University School
of Law, Hempstead, New York. The
sample language contained at the end
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system published by Interactive Legal
Systems (www.ilsdocs.com) and is
published here with its permission.
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in his or her property to another, or
under Section 2514 by the exercise,
release, or lapse of a general power of
appointment in favor of another.
A beneficiary of a trust may be treated as making a gift for federal gift tax
purposes in the same ways: (1) under
Section 2514 by the exercise, release, or
lapse of a general power of appointment of property held in the trust in
favor of another or (2) under Section
2511 by the transfer of an interest the
beneficiary holds in the trust. For
example, the exercise of a special
power of appointment in favor of
another by the income beneficiary of a
trust is a gift of the income interest
lost by that exercise. Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2514–1(b)(2); Estate of Regester v.
Commissioner, 83 T.C. 1 (1984). Similarly,
the irrevocable assignment by the presumptive remainder beneficiary of a
vested remainder interest in property
(subject to being divested only in the
event he or she fails to survive another
or the occurrence of another event) is a
gift. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511–1(h)(6).
A transfer of trust property in which
the trustee has no beneficial interest, by
a trustee acting in his or her fiduciary
capacity to another individual, is not
considered a transfer subject to gift tax.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511–1(g)(1). For example, a trustee who makes a discretionary distribution to a beneficiary of
income or corpus of the trust would
not be treated as making a gift, even
though the trustee is the legal owner of
the trust estate. This may not be true if
the trustee is also the grantor or a beneficiary. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511–1(g)(2).
Even if a trustee is also a beneficiary
of the trust, a transfer by the trustee is
not subject to gift tax if it is made
under a fiduciary power limited by a
reasonably fixed or ascertainable standard that is set forth in the trust instrument. This definition includes a clearly
measurable standard under which the
holder of a power is legally accountable; for example, a power to distribute
corpus for the beneficiary’s education,
health, maintenance, or support; for the
beneficiary’s reasonable support and
comfort; or to enable the beneficiary to
maintain an accustomed standard of
living. The implication is that a fiduci-

ary who has a beneficial interest in
property will be treated as making a
gift by transferring it to another if the
transfer, even if effected in a fiduciary
capacity, is not in accordance with such
an ascertainable standard.
Analogies in the Estate Tax
The interaction between state law fiduciary duty concepts and transfer tax
principles is context-sensitive. For
example, in the estate tax context, if the
grantor of a trust limits her retained
powers by an ascertainable standard,
the grantor avoids inclusion under
Section 2036(a)(2). See Rev. Rul. 73–143,
1973–1 C.B. 407. Generally, the grantor
can avoid inclusion under Section
2036(a)(2) when a retained power is
subject to a fiduciary duty that state
law imposes on corporate officers and
directors. See United States v. Byrum,
408 U.S. 125 (1972). On the other hand,
if a grantor retains discretion, as
trustee, to choose among beneficiaries
in making distributions, Section
2036(a)(2) will apply in the absence of
an ascertainable standard. In other
words, the general fiduciary duty that
state law imposes on a trustee is not
sufficient to negate the applicability of
Section 2036(a)(2). See United States v.
O’Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966).
The regulations under Section 2041,
relating to estate tax inclusion of property over which the decedent holds a
general power of appointment, take a
two-track approach. In the case of a
power to consume or invade trust
property, the powerholder is deemed
to have a general power of appointment unless the power is limited by an
ascertainable standard. Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2041–1(c)(2). In the case of an
administrative power, by contrast,
there is no need for the power to be circumscribed by an ascertainable standard to avoid estate tax inclusion. If the
power is held in a fiduciary capacity,
the duty generally applicable to a fiduciary will suffice to avoid inclusion.
Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2041–1(b)(1);
25.2514–1(b)(1). Even if the exercise of
the administrative power can produce
significant benefits for the powerholder, Section 2041 does not apply under
this rule. See, e.g., PLR 8908032. What
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It seems virtually
certain that the
exercise, release, or
lapse of a general
power held by a
fiduciary in favor of
another is a gift.
accounts for the Treasury’s willingness
to exclude from the reach of Sections
2041 and 2514 administrative powers
that are subject to general fiduciary
duty principles while, at the same time,
these general principles are insufficient
to avoid inclusion under Section 2036
for a grantor? Although the rationale
for this distinction is not clear, the more
lenient approach taken in the case of
administrative powers probably
reflects a concern that, were the rule
otherwise, Sections 2041 and 2514
would prevent the designation of a
beneficiary as a trustee in the overwhelming majority of cases, given that
trustees typically have discretion
regarding various administrative matters. Although the administrative
power provision is helpful for grantors
who wish to name a beneficiary as
trustee, it remains unclear whether any
given power will fall within its scope.
Actions by Fiduciaries That Might
Be Considered Gifts
As indicated above, under certain circumstances, an executor or trustee who
is a beneficiary of the estate or trust (an
“interested fiduciary”) might be
deemed to have sufficient control over
and interest in the estate or trust property that an action taken in a fiduciary
capacity might be considered a gift by
the fiduciary. There seem to be at least
two categories of actions that might
result in a gift by the interested fiduciary: (1) the actual distribution of property by the fiduciary and (2) the exercise by a fiduciary of certain tax-related
elections under a will or trust that have
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the effect of altering the value or existence of other beneficial interests in the
estate or trust. This might occur when
the exercise (or non-exercise) of a tax
election or option is viewed as the
equivalent of the exercise, release, or
lapse of a general power of appointment held by the fiduciary or the fiduciary is deemed to have transferred a
property interest he or she holds
individually.
Possible Gifts by Fiduciaries
Through Tax Elections
and Options
Failure to Exercise Right of
Reimbursement
For example, an executor who also is
the residuary legatee of the decedent’s
probate estate and whose will does not
direct all estate taxes on nonprobate
property to be paid from the residue
probably would be treated as making
gifts if the executor does not seek reimbursement of the estate taxes allocable
to those receiving or holding taxable
nonprobate property. This failure to
seek reimbursement appears to be a
release by the executor of a general
power of appointment. The executor
has the power to obtain the property
for his or her individual benefit but
chooses not to do so. As indicated
above, it seems virtually certain that
the exercise, release, or lapse of a general power held by a fiduciary in favor
of another is a gift. See, e.g., Code
§ 2207B (addressing reimbursement for
estate taxes attributable to a qualified
terminable interest property (QTIP)
trust included in the decedent’s estate
under Code § 2044).
Election to Deduct Administration
Expenses
As a general rule, an executor may
choose to deduct administration
expenses for income or estate tax purposes. Code §§ 212, 642(c), 2053. The
choice by the fiduciary to deduct them
on the fiduciary income tax return
(Form 1041) or on the federal estate tax
return (Form 706) may reduce or augment the marital deduction available in
the decedent’s estate. If the executor is
the surviving spouse or one of the

other beneficiaries, then this might be
considered a gift to the surviving
spouse or the other beneficiaries. If the
fiduciary is a beneficiary of the marital
deduction share or the balance of the
estate, the fiduciary might be deemed
to have made a gift to the other beneficiaries by electing to deduct administration expenses on the income tax
return or the estate tax return, depending on the circumstances.
For example, a wife dies in 2004
(when the federal estate tax exemption
equivalent is $1.5 million), leaving an
estate of $2.5 million, and provides in
her will that the minimum amount
necessary to reduce her federal estate
tax to its minimum shall pass to her
U.S. citizen husband (and thereby qualify for the marital deduction under
Code § 2056), with the balance passing
to her daughter. Assuming the decedent had made no prior gifts that used
any of her estate tax exemption equivalent and the estate had no debts, taxes,
or expenses to pay, the first $1 million
would pass to her husband, leaving a
taxable estate of $1.5 million to pass,
estate-tax-free, to her daughter. If the
decedent’s estate incurs $100,000 of
estate administration expenses, the
executor must decide whether to
deduct those expenses on the estate tax
return or on the estate income tax
return. If the executor deducts them on
the estate tax return, the minimum
amount necessary to qualify for the
marital deduction is now $900,000, still
leaving $1.5 million to pass to the
daughter. In effect, the burden of the
expenses will be borne by the husband.
If the executor deducts the expenses on
the income tax return, the entire
$100,000 will be borne by the daughter’s share. If the husband is named as
the executor, he can essentially take an
extra $100,000 of his wife’s estate for
himself by deducting those expenses
on the income tax return, or have the
daughter receive an extra $100,000 by
deducting them on the estate tax
return. It is arguable that if the husband chooses to take the expenses on
the estate tax return, so that he receives
less and the daughter receives more, he
has made a gift to her. An analogous
issue arises if the daughter is executor.

She can benefit herself or the husband
depending on where she takes the
expenses. It is arguable that she will
make a gift to him if she takes them in
a manner so as to benefit the husband.
As discussed later, state law limitations
on how an interested fiduciary may
exercise a power and adjustments
required by state law between the
interests of the beneficiaries may avoid
the potential imposition of gift tax in
such cases.
As in the case of an interested executor who fails to force reimbursement
for contribution of estate tax, the executor who may exercise the power to
deduct estate administration expenses
in a manner that financially favors him
or her but fails to do so may be treated
as making a gift. Such an exercise
would be treated as a gift on the
ground that the fiduciary’s exercise of
the tax option is the equivalent of the
exercise, release, or lapse of a general
power of appointment in favor of
another.
Election of Alternate
Valuation Date
The choice whether to elect the alternate valuation date under Code
§ 2032 will change how much tax will
be due and may also result in a shift of
property from one beneficiary to another. For example, a man dies in 2004
with an estate having a date-of-death
value of $2.7 million, consisting of
property jointly owned with rights of
survivorship with his sister worth $1.6
million (all of which is included in his
estate under Code § 2040) and a probate estate of $1.5 million. His will provides that his wife is to receive the minimum amount necessary to reduce his
federal estate tax to its minimum, with
any balance passing to his son. Because
the property jointly owned with his sister exceeds the estate tax exemption
equivalent of $1.5 million, his entire
probate estate will pass to his wife. On
the alternate valuation date, the value
of the property owned at death with
the sister drops to $1.3 million while
the value of the probate estate remains
at $1.5 million. Because the jointly
owned asset is the only property subject to estate tax, taxes will be lower if
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alternate valuation is selected, but,
using alternate valuation date values,
the minimum marital deduction
amount necessary to reduce the federal
estate tax to its minimum drops from
$1.5 million to $1.3 million. As a result,
$200,000 would pass to the son. If the
widow is executor, she can benefit herself by using date-of-death values or
benefit the son by choosing alternate
valuation. If the son is the executor, the
result will be the same. If the interested
executor chooses to benefit the other
probate beneficiary, will he or she be
deemed to have made a gift? Again, it
is arguable that the fiduciary would be
treated as exercising a general power of
appointment in favor of another by
deciding to use the valuation date that
benefits the other person and reduce by
the same amount what the executor
personally will receive.
Clayton QTIP Election
Another case in which a fiduciary’s
decision may result in a shift in property from himself or herself to another occurs in a so-called Clayton
QTIP election. See Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2056(b)–7(d)(3)(i); Estate of
Clayton v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 327
(1991), rev’d, 976 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir.
1992). The regulations allow an estate
tax marital deduction for property
passing into a trust described in Section
2056(b)(7) (a QTIP trust) to the extent
the executor makes the election under
that section, even if the property would
pass in a form not qualifying for the
marital deduction to the extent the
executor does not elect the treatment
under the section. In other words, to
the extent the executor makes the QTIP
election, the property will pass into a
trust from which the surviving spouse
will be entitled to receive the income
for life. To the extent the executor does
not make the QTIP election, the property probably will pass in a different way,
which may not qualify for the marital
deduction. If the surviving spouse is
the executor, he or she may be deemed
to have made a gift to the extent he or
she does not elect QTIP treatment
when the estate planning document
provides for a Clayton QTIP. Similarly,
if one of those who would receive

property to the extent QTIP treatment
is not elected is an executor, that fiduciary may make a gift to the extent he or
she elects QTIP treatment. Again, the
basis for the gift by the spouse or the
other interested executor would be the
exercise, release, or lapse of a general
power of appointment in favor of
another.
Spouse/Executor Failure to
Elect QTIP
A spouse who is an executor should
not be treated as having made a gift by
not electing QTIP treatment when the
interest created for the spouse under
Section 2056(b)(7) is not a Clayton QTIP
but a “regular” QTIP. In such a case,
the form of the spouse’s interest in the
deceased spouse’s estate will not
change by the election, because in
either case the spouse will be entitled
to all of the income from the trust for
life. But, to the extent the executor does
not elect QTIP treatment, estate taxes
may increase. The executor may
decline to elect QTIP treatment for several reasons. For example, the estate of
the spouse who is first to die may have
available estate tax credits that will be
useable only if the estate of the
deceased spouse is taxable or the taxable estate is larger. If the surviving
spouse might die relatively soon after
the first spouse dies, generating estate
tax in the first estate may provide the
estate of the surviving spouse with a
prior transfer credit under Section 2013
that would reduce the overall taxes
that will be due on both estates. If the
QTIPable trust carries the additional
estate taxes generated by not electing
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QTIP treatment, its corpus will be
smaller and so will the income the surviving spouse receives for his or her
lifetime. The reduction in the income
interest held by the spouse by failing to
elect QTIP treatment should not be a
gift, however, because no property
interest seems to be transferred to or
for another individual. The gift tax
applies only to the transmission of
property to another individual—here,
the transfer is to the IRS (and, perhaps,
some state tax authority).
Suppose, however, that the executor
who will decide the extent to which the
QTIP election is made is a beneficiary
who will benefit from the choice to
make the election. For example, the
executor is the daughter of the husband who dies first. His estate is so
small that it will be taxed at less than
the “top” federal estate tax rate. The
widow has property of her own. When
she dies, the property in the trust her
husband has created for her probably
will face higher estate taxes if it is
included in the widow’s estate under
Section 2044 than if the tax were paid
at the husband’s death. This will occur
for two reasons: first, the widow’s
property will be combined with that in
the QTIP and be pushed into a higher
estate tax bracket, and second, the
estate tax on the QTIP will be imposed
under Section 2207B at the highest
marginal rate(s) her estate will face. In
such a case, the daughter likely would
be economically better off by not electing QTIP treatment. By making the
election, no tax is due in the estate of
the first spouse to die and the surviving spouse has a larger income interest
for life. The action of the daughter as
executor increases the economic benefit
to the surviving spouse, and that benefit is capable of being measured. It is
not certain, however, what the daughter has “lost.” Although one might
speculate that the daughter’s remainder interest in the QTIP ultimately will
be greater if no QTIP election is made,
that cannot be certain. Between the
deaths of the two spouses, levels of
estate tax exemption, rates of estate tax,
and other legal developments could
mean the daughter will net more if the
QTIP election is made. The “loss” of
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property to the daughter seems to be
too speculative to measure and, therefore, it seems that her decision to elect
QTIP treatment should not constitute a
gift. See generally Mitchell M. Gans,
Gift Tax: Valuation Difficulties and Gift
Completion, 58 Notre Dame L. Rev. 493
(1983). Certainly, if the trustee, other
than the daughter, may invade the
QTIP trust other than under an ascertainable standard, the daughter’s
expectancy in the remainder is highly
speculative and may have a market
value approaching zero.
Method of Administration
A fiduciary normally has broad powers
of management over the property,
including the right to decide whether
assets should be sold or exchanged and
how funds should be invested. In
many cases, these administrative powers can profoundly affect beneficiaries.
For example, a trustee of a trust
required to pay income to a beneficiary
may control, within broad parameters,
how much income the trust produces.
The beneficiary will probably receive
more and the successor beneficiaries
less if the trustee invests for current
income production rather than for
growth. If the trustee is a beneficiary of
the trust, the fiduciary may invest to
benefit himself or herself, on the one
side, or other beneficiaries, on the
other. For example, if the trustee is entitled to all income, the trustee may benefit personally, at least in the short run,
by investing heavily for relatively high
current income production rather than
for long-term growth. On the other
hand, if the trustee is a remainder beneficiary, the fiduciary probably may
favor himself or herself by investing
heavily for long-term growth rather
than for current income production.
The manner in which the trustee/beneficiary exercises that investment power
does not seem to be a gift. “The mere
power of management, investment,
custody of assets, or the power to allocate receipts and disbursements as
between income and principal, exercisable in a fiduciary capacity, whereby the
holder has no power to enlarge or shift
any of the beneficial interests therein
except as an incidental consequence of

the discharge of such fiduciary duties
is not a power of appointment.” Treas.
Reg. § 25.2514–1(b)(1) (emphasis
added).
Other “management” powers might
be treated differently. For example,
under the law of most states, a trustee
may exercise a power to adjust the
income and corpus accounts in a manner that is reasonable and impartial
and/or to convert a trust to a unitrust
(that is, one paying a fixed percentage
of the changing value of the trust). It is
uncertain whether that power, if held
by a trustee who is a beneficiary of the
trust, falls under the regulatory exception under Section 2514 quoted previously. At least some states have foreclosed an interested trustee from exercising those powers, which should
foreclose the possibility of such a
trustee from making a gift by reason of
a power to adjust or to convert. See,
e.g., N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law
(EPTL) § 11–2.3(b)(5)(C)(vii), (viii)
(power to adjust). New York law contains no similar restriction for a unitrust conversion. See EPTL § 11–2.4.
Disproportionate Distributions
of Basis
Often, more than one person will succeed to interests in an estate or trust.
Frequently, under local law or the
terms of the governing instrument, the
fiduciary will have the authority to distribute different assets with different
income tax bases to different beneficiaries even though they are entitled to the
same share or proportion of a share as
other beneficiaries. For example, a
woman dies and leaves her estate in
equal shares to her two sons but names
only her younger son as the executor.
When the administration of the estate
ends, the estate available for distribution consists of a block of stock then
worth $500,000 with a basis of $350,000
and a bond then worth $500,000 and
with a basis also equal to $500,000. If
local law or the governing instrument
permits the executor to distribute different assets to different beneficiaries,
nonhomogeneous distributions to the
brothers probably will not result in any
taxable exchange for income tax purposes. See Rev. Rul. 69–486, 1969–2 C.B.

159. Armed with such authority, the
younger son may personally benefit by
distributing the bond to himself and
the stock to his brother. If he fails to do
so, will he be making a gift? The value
of the economic benefit he would be
conferring on his brother probably can
be measured.
Other Elections and Options
As indicated earlier, there are dozens of
tax options and elections fiduciaries
may make. Many will benefit one beneficiary at a cost to another. How the
benefit or detriment of the election
affects the beneficiaries between or
among themselves may be easy or difficult to discern. For example, an interested executor who is a skip person for
generation-skipping transfer tax purposes would immediately benefit by
allocating the decedent’s remaining
GST exemption under Section 2632 to
his or her bequest as opposed to allocating it to bequests made to other skip
persons. The saving probably is simple
to discern, but the benefits and costs of
electing under Section 2032A to have
real property used in a farm or other
closely held business especially valued
for estate tax purposes may be much
more difficult to determine. It is unlikely, however, that difficulty in determining the exact amount of property shifted would prevent the IRS from claiming that an interested fiduciary has
made a gift by exercising (or not exercising) the election.
State Law Curbs on
Fiduciary Action
Even an expansive reading of the portion of Treas. Reg. § 25.2514–1(b)(1)
relating to administrative provisions
(quoted above) does not per se prevent
a shift in property by a tax election
exercised by an interested fiduciary
from characterization as a gift by such
a fiduciary. In the event such a shift
might otherwise be deemed a gift, state
law may limit an interested fiduciary’s
exercise (or non-exercise) of a tax
option or election so as to prevent gift
characterization.
State law may control certain tax
elections and options. For example,
many states require that, for purposes
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of determining the extent to which
noncash assets satisfy a dollar (pecuniary) legacy, such assets must be valued at their date-of-distribution fair
market value. See, e.g., EPTL
§ 2–1.9(b)(1). Some states further limit
the manner in which certain tax elections may be taken into account in
readjusting interests of beneficiaries.
See, e.g., EPTL § 11–1.2. In any case,
most states prohibit a fiduciary from
engaging in any act of self-dealing,
although some states permit self-dealing with court approval or allow the
prohibition to be waived in the governing instrument. See Restatement (Third)
of Trusts § 228 (1992). Some statutes,
however, invalidate provisions of a
governing instrument that attempt to
grant a fiduciary immunity from certain actions. See EPTL § 11–1.7. At least
in some cases, these limitations may
curb the manner in which a fiduciary,
who is also a beneficiary, may exercise
tax elections so that such a trustee or
executor should not be treated as having made a gift even if he or she exercises the election in a manner that
results in a shift of property from himself or herself to another beneficiary.
In determining whether to instruct
interested fiduciaries on how to exercise a tax option, one court has stated:
“The principles governing judicial
intervention should trace the fiduciary’s own guidelines in exercising tax
elections. These have been summarized
as three aspects of fiduciary duty:
(1) the duty to minimize the over-all
tax burden on the estate and its beneficiaries; (2) the duty of impartiality; and
(3) the duty to abstain from self-dealing.” In re Estate of Rappaport, 467
N.Y.S.2d 814, 816 (N.Y. 1983).
In a seminal case, Matter of Colp,
N.Y. Law J., Jan. 20, 1976, p. 8, col. 2,
the decedent’s widow and the decedent’s son by a prior marriage were the
executors and beneficiaries under his
will. Each desired to elect a different
valuation date for estate tax purposes.
The valuation date each sought would
have resulted in that executor receiving
more as a beneficiary under the will
than if the other election were made.
The court refused to instruct the executors on how they should exercise the

tax election but, in effect, required them
to make a decision that would not
result in financial injury to other beneficiaries of the estate. That case suggests
that an interested fiduciary would not
be able to exercise a tax election in a
manner that personally benefited him
or her at the expense of another beneficiary who is not also a fiduciary—and
that, in turn, suggests that the fiduciary
should not be treated as making a gift,
in such a case, if the exercise is to the
detriment of the fiduciary and benefits
the other beneficiary.
The same court that decided Colp
later decided In re Estate of Fales, 431
N.Y.S.2d 763 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1980). In
Fales, the court did direct the fiduciaries
on how to exercise a power that had
tax consequences when the fiduciaries
would personally benefit, potentially at
the expense of others who were not
fiduciaries; in fact, the court permitted
them to exercise the power to benefit
themselves. The surrogate stated, in
reaching his decision: “I now believe
that this court should provide guidance

State law normally
prohibits a trustee
from committing an
act of self-dealing.
and direction to fiduciaries presented
with Colp-type tax election decisions
and other determinations involving tax
consequences.” Id. at 764.
That same court, in considering the
issue of how a fiduciary, apparently
regardless of whether the fiduciary is
also a beneficiary, should exercise a tax
election, suggested that “[i]t may well
be, for example, that fiduciaries should
minimize taxes for their estates
whether or not their choice benefits
themselves, and that the beneficiaries
or this court ought to strike a compromise for the equitable purpose of sharing the gains and losses which shelter
the estate as a whole.” Fales, 431
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N.Y.S.2d at 764. In other words, the
court is suggesting that, perhaps, the
fiduciary should exercise a tax election
(or option) in a manner that reduces
overall taxes and then share the savings to make whole those who “lost”
by the election. In some ways this is an
inviting concept that, if local law does
require that an interested fiduciary
who is “injured” by the election be
made whole, should prevent such a
fiduciary from being deemed to have
made a gift. The net result would be
that there would be no shift of property
from the fiduciary to another beneficiary; it would simply be a shift from the
tax authorities to another beneficiary.
Indeed, federal tax law strongly suggests that the effects of an equitable
adjustment, when required by local
law, will be determinative of the ultimate tax consequences of the election.
See, e.g., Estate of Britenstool v.
Commissioner, 46 T.C. 711 (1966), acq.
and nonacq. 1978–2 C.B. 1, 3.
Nevertheless, the court that decided
Rappaport may have come to a somewhat different judgment in another
context. In Estate of Louise Gould, N.Y.
LAW J., Oct. 21, 2002, p. 26, col. 6 (Surr.
Ct. Nassau Co.), the trustee was, along
with his brother, a remainder beneficiary of a trust entitled to one-half of the
property in a trust that his mother had
created for his now-deceased father.
The trustee had distributed assets with
a higher income tax basis to himself
than to his brother. Governing law
allowed a trustee to make nonhomogeneous distributions. The court, apparently without considering what would
result in the largest tax savings and
directing that each beneficiary at least
be made whole, ordered the interested
trustee
to exchange the requisite securities
for cash from the [remainder beneficiary who is the trustee] so as to
equalize the benefit of the distribution as of the date of the initial distribution. In other words, the [brother who is not a trustee] will return
one-half of the shares of [low basis]
stock to the [brother who is the
trustee] while the [brother who is
the trustee] shall give [the brother
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who is not a trustee] one-half of the
cash he originally retained, plus
accrued interest.
Id.
State law normally prohibits a
trustee from committing an act of selfdealing. Exercising an election in a
manner that personally benefits the
fiduciary could be viewed, at least in
some states, as an unlawful and voidable act of self-dealing. If that were the
case, the IRS would have a powerful
argument that an election that benefits
the fiduciary personally is voidable as a
matter of state law and, therefore, will
be ignored for federal tax purposes.
In any case, in deciding whether
state law, which does not seem welldeveloped on the issue in any jurisdiction, may so restrict an interested
trustee or executor in making a tax
election, at least two additional issues
probably should be considered. The
first is determining whether state law
limits the manner of exercise of a tax
option by an executor or trustee who
may personally benefit from it.
Although instructions may be sought
from the local court having jurisdiction
over the estate, as occurred in In re
Estate of Fales, such local court decisions
may not bind the IRS or the federal
courts. See Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967). It is at least
arguable that, if the fiduciary is
instructed by the court before making
the election, exercising the option in
favor of another is not a gift. See Rev.
Rul. 73–142, 1973–1 C.B. 405. Here it is
arguable that, if the local court decision
is made before the election is made, the
election falls under the protection of
Rev. Rul. 73–142. See also Harris v.
Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950). The
IRS might contend, however, that commencing the proceeding, if and when it
results in the elimination of the power
to exercise it in the fiduciary’s own
favor, is the equivalent of a release of a
general power of appointment if the
court’s decision is not consistent with
local law.
One should also explore whether
state law might require, as suggested
above, that the fiduciary exercise the
option in the manner that minimizes

overall taxation, as is suggested by the
court’s statement in In re Estate of Fales
quoted above. If that result were
required by state law, there would
seem to be no gift when a fiduciary so
exercises a tax election even if the election results in a shift from an interested
fiduciary to another beneficiary. State
law might, in turn, require an equitable
adjustment back to the interested fiduciary. Such a direction should foreclose
the possibility that the interested executor or trustee has made a gift. See generally Joel Dobris, Equitable Adjustments
in Post Mortem Income Tax Planning, 65
Iowa L. Rev. 103 (1979). And, although
much has been written about equitable
adjustments, the law is actually sparsely developed. In some cases, an equitable adjustment is prohibited by state
law. See, e.g., EPTL § 11–1.2(b)(1). In
addition, the net tax savings may not
change, such as in the case in which the
executor may allocate the decedent’s
unused GST exemption to more than
one bequest to skip persons.
Summary, Conclusions, and
Sample Language
It is not certain if or when the exercise
of a tax election or option will cause a
fiduciary to be treated as making a gift
when the exercise results in a shift of
property from an interested fiduciary
to another beneficiary. Basic gift tax
rules, however, suggest that a gift
might be made in some situations. In at
least one case, the concerned fiduciaries sought and obtained the appointment of an independent trustee to exercise discretion. See Estate of Lillian
Goldman, N.Y. Law J., Sept. 5, 2003,
p. 20 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. Co.). Although
state law may adequately restrict how
an interested fiduciary may exercise tax
elections, the law may not be adequately developed in many states to give
confidence in that result.
Great prudence would suggest that
no beneficiary ever be appointed as an
executor or trustee. That, of course, is
unrealistic. A more practical solution to
avoiding the potential gift problem,
perhaps, is to have appropriate provisions in the governing document.
For example, the property owner
might appoint a fiduciary who is not a

beneficiary to make all tax elections
that could result in an enlargement or
shift of any beneficial interest. Such a
provision might read as follows:
[Name of fiduciary who is not a
beneficiary] shall alone make all
decisions with respect to any and all
tax elections and options, under
federal, state, or local law, the exercise or nonexercise of which could
result in an enlargement, diminution, or shift of any beneficial interest hereunder. [Name of fiduciary
who is not a beneficiary] shall participate in no other fiduciary decision hereunder.
Alternatively, the governing document could require the appointment of
a fiduciary who is not a beneficiary
under the instrument if the fiduciaries,
who are beneficiaries, may exercise a
tax election or option that could
enlarge or shift any beneficial interest.
Such a provision might read:
No individual fiduciary shall participate in any decision with respect to
any tax election or option, under
federal, state, or local law, that could
enlarge, diminish, or shift his or her
beneficial interest hereunder from or
to the beneficial interest hereunder
of another person. If the only fiduciary or fiduciaries who otherwise
could exercise such tax election or
option hold such beneficial interests
hereunder, another individual or a
bank or trust company (but not an
individual, bank or trust company
that is related or subordinate within
the meaning of Code Section 672(c)
to any acting fiduciary hereunder)
shall be appointed by the fiduciary
or fiduciaries then acting hereunder
and the fiduciary so appointed shall
alone exercise such election or
option. 䊏
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